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Whenever goods cross national borders within the channels of  a multina- 
tional  corporation  (MNC),  a  transfer  price  must  be  calculated  for  tax 
purposes. When corporate tax rates differ on the two sides of the border, the 
MNC has an incentive to set its transfer prices in a way that reduces its tax 
burden by  reporting higher profits in the country where corporate profits are 
taxed more lightly. 
The ability of MNCs to set transfer prices to minimize taxes, however, is 
circumscribed by  the tax regulations of  the home and host countries. In the 
United  States,  Section  482  of  the  Internal  Revenue  Code  requires  that 
transfer prices for imports and exports of goods and services be set equal to 
“arm’s length prices.” 
Defining arm’s length prices is often nontrivial. Unless the good transferred 
is perfectly homogeneous and has  a well-functioning arm’s length market, 
determination of  “arm’s length”  prices will involve some arbitrariness. The 
process of  determining arm’s length prices in practice is one of negotiation 
with the U.S.  Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The numerous court  cases 
involving arm’s length pricing  (LaMont  1975) are  an  indication that  the 
process is not cut and dried. 
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Allegations of  “abuses”  of  transfer pricing are widespread, where abuse 
is loosely defined as a divergence between transfer prices and some notion of 
arm’s  length  prices.  These  allegations  are  supported  by  some  indirect 
evidence (La11  1973; Vaitsos  1974; Jenkins and  Wright  1975; Roumeliotis 
1977;  Bertrand  1981),  but  there  have  been  no  direct  comparisons of 
interaffiliate and arm’s length prices. This paper carries out such a study for 
the U.S. petroleum industry. 
The main reason for choosing the petroleum industry is data availability. 
The main limitation in examining this industry is that its tax history in the 
United States, for both purely domestic companies and multinationals, has 
been  quite  different  from  that  of  manufacturing. Thus,  one  should  be 
extremely cautious in generalizing results from petroleum to other industries. 
Nevertheless, there  is much to be  said for examining petroleum, quite 
apart from data availability. As seen in table 4.1, in the last decade for which 
tax data are available, the oil and gas industry has accounted for between 
one-third and two-thirds of U.S. taxable income from abroad, paid well over 
half  of  foreign taxes, and earned a similar fraction of  foreign tax credits. 
Roughly speaking, the petroleum industry from this standpoint is about as 
large as all other industries combined. 
Table 4.1 is also useful for obtaining a rough idea of the tax position of the 
industry. From column 5,  the average foreign tax rate is very high, more than 
double that for other industries. From column 6, the ratio of  the foreign tax 
credit to U.S.  taxable  income from abroad is close to  the  U.S.  statutory 
corporate tax rate, suggesting that there was little tax left to be paid at home. 
From column 7, whereas other industries were able to offset almost every 
dollar of foreign tax paid against U.S. tax liabilities, the petroleum industry 
was  able to offset only half  to three-quarters of  the foreign taxes it paid. 
These figures are averages across all countries; as discussed below, situations 
vary from one country to another. 
The U.S. petroleum industry has been alleged to be a notorious abuser of 
transfer pricing (see, e.g., U.S.  Congress 1977; Bertrand 1981). In addition 
to purely political considerations, there are at least three reasons for this. 
First, until the mid-l970s, U.S.  MNCs were permitted by  the IRS to treat 
virtually all payments to governments for oil abroad as foreign income taxes, 
enabling the companies to deduct these costs directly from their U.S.  tax 
liabilities rather than  from their taxable income.  The incentive was  thus 
very strong for them to make these payments appear as large as possible. 
The second reason is the nature of the petroleum market. Crude oil, a raw 
material, accounts for most of  the petroleum moving in international trade. 
Until the 1980s, there was virtually no spot-auction market in crude oil (see 
Hubbard and Weiner  1989). The arm’s length market was one of  long-term 
contracts.  Crude  oil  is  not  a  homogeneous product,  and  contract  terms 
depend inter alia on its sulfur and gravity, size of ship transporting the cargo, 
and terms of credit. In addition, as Hines (1988b) points out, the contractual 125  Multinationals, Transfer Prices, and  Taxes 
relation  itself  can  have  value  by,  for  example,  mitigating  moral  hazard 
problems (referred to  in  the contracting literature as  ‘‘opportunism”;  see 
Williamson 1975). Moreover, the market  for crude oil is not competitive; 
rather, it has been dominated by OPEC, a cartel whose power has waxed and 
waned over time. Oligopolistic interaction among sellers is likely to lead to 
varying  degrees  of  freight  absorption  in  markets  with  geographically 
dispersed production,  so  that  the  arm’s  length  price  will  depend on  the 
exporting country and point  of  destination.  In  the case of  petroleum, the 
Atlantic and Pacific markets are particularly likely to differ because moving 
the product between them is costly. 
The final reason is the sheer size of  the industry. While crude oil is not 
perfectly homogeneous, it is more homogeneous than other products often 
cited for transfer-price abuse such as pharmaceuticals. Although the scope 
for transfer-price manipulation may be substantially smaller as a percentage 
of  arm’s  length  price,  when  multiplied  by  the  enormous  volume  of 
petroleum  moving  in  international trade,  the revenue transferred,  and  tax 
avoided, is potentially great. 
Suspicions of tax evasion through transfer pricing by the industy have not 
been limited to researchers and politicians. In 1978, the IRS created a special 
unit, the Petroleum Industry Program, to monitor the industry and, inter alia, 
make determinations regarding arm’s length prices. The U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE) monitored transfer prices in the course of  administering the 
regulatory  program  imposed  on  the  domestic  petroleum  industry  in  the 
1970s. This monitoring process is the source of the data used in this study, 
which  were  required  to  be  submitted  to  the  U.S.  Energy  Information 
Administration (EIA),  the  data-collection  branch  of  DOE,  by  American 
companies that import crude oil. 
The approach in this paper is as follows. First, we use regression methods 
to isolate systematic differences between third-party and interaffiliate prices, 
controlling for the factors discussed above. One hypothesis we examine is 
whether  the  rise  of  the  spot market  and  centralization of  IRS  petroleum 
expertise at the end of  the  1970s resulted in  a reduced scope for creative 
transfer pricing. We  then go on to relate these differences to the tax regimes 
of exporting countries. 
4.1  Data 
The data were  obtained from EIA,  which  deleted any information that 
would  allow identification of  individual firms. The  data  are described in 
some detail in Weiner (1986) and Anderson (1988);’  the discussion here is 
limited to attributes salient to this paper. The data cover the period October 
1973-0ctober  1984,3 a period that encompasses tremendous variations in oil 
prices, changes in the structure of the petroleum industry, and tax rates. The 
data  base  contains  information  on  dates  of  loading  and  importation, Table 4.1  U.S. Foreign Income, Tax, and Tax Credit, Oil and Gas Industry versus all Industries ($ million) 
(5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
(1)  Foreign Tax  Foreign Tax  Foreign Tax  Foreign Tax 
Carryover  U.S. Taxable  (2)  (4)  as % of  Credit  Credit 
Income from  Foreign Tax  (3)  Foreign  U.S. Taxable  as % of  as % of  as % of 
Sources  Accrued  Carryover  Computed  (2)/(1)  (4M  1)  (4~2)  (3)44) 
Foreign  Paid or  Foreign Tax  Tax  Credit  Income  U.S. Income  Foreign Tax  Credit 
1972: 
Oil and gas 
Other industries 
All industries 
Oil and gadall industries 
Oil and gas 
Other industries 
All industries 
Oil and gaslall industries 
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exporting  country,  port  of  landing,  f.0.b. and  landed  prices,  sulfur  and 
gravity, credit terms, volume, and transaction type for cargoes of  crude oil 
imported into the United States during this peri~d.~  While  some previous 
analysts have  concluded that  the  absence of  a  “market  price”  precludes 
assessment of  transfer-price manipulation (Rugman  1985),  we  are able to 
take  advantage  of  this  information  in  the  regression  analysis,  thereby 
correcting for much of the heterogeneity discussed above. 
For  our  purposes,  the  most  interesting aspect  of  the  data  base  is  the 
breakdown of  imports by type of transaction, whether interaffiliate transfers 
(designated type A below) or arm’s length purchases. The latter is further 
broken  down  into  purchases  directly  from  host  governments  (type  H), 
“third-party”  purchases (purchases from other firms, designated type T), 
and  arm’s  length  purchases with  type of  seller unreported  (type U).  The 
decline  of  the  major  multinational  oil  companies  and  the  rise  of  state 
enterprises in  oil-exporting countries is reflected  in  the falling share over 
time  of  interaffiliate transfers  relative  to  arm’s  length  transactions.  The 
breakdown  of  transaction  types  for  purchases  from  each  oil-exporting 
country is provided for an illustrative year in table 4.2. 
4.2  Hypotheses Regarding Transfer Pricing 
The hypotheses about transfer-price behavior are straightforward. Multina- 
tional petroleum companies set transfer prices that  differ from their arm’s 
length prices when they have the incentive and the ability to do so. Ceteris 
paribus,  firms that  produce crude oil  in  countries with  effective marginal 
corporate tax rates (9)  that exceed the rate  in the United  States (tus) will 
reduce their tax obligations by reporting transfer prices as low as possible. 
At  the margin, the dollar in profit  “lost”  in the host country will reduce 
firms’ tax obligations by 9, while increasing their U.S. tax obligation by  an 
amount tus < 9. Similarly, when tus  > 9,  firms have an incentive to report 
greater profits in the host country, in order for as much of  their revenue as 
possible to be taxed at the lower rate abroad. 
In practice, calculations of tax obligations are complicated by the fact that 
U.S. MNCs must pay U.S. corporate tax on income earned by  their foreign 
subsidiaries. In order to avoid double taxation, the IRS allows U.S. MNCs to 
credit foreign taxes paid against their U.S. tax obligations. In terms of this 
very  simple model,  the U.S. MNC  would owe U.S.  tax of  tus-+  on the 
marginal dollar of profit if  fus  > 9. If  the foreign rate exceeds the U.S. rate, 
the U.S. MNC owes no tax to the United States at the margin. 
When fus  > 9,  U.S. MNCs nonetheless have an incentive to report profits 
abroad  because  the  U.S.  tax  owed  is  payable  only  when  the  profit  is 
repatriated  to  the  United  States.  By  investing their  profits  abroad,  U.S. 
MNCs  can thus defer their U.S. tax obligations. When 9  exceeds tus,  the 
difference is an excess foreign tax credit,  which the U.S.  MNC  can carry 129  Multinationals, Transfer Prices, and Taxes 
Table 4.2  Number of Transactions by Type, 1981 
Type of Transaction 




































































































60  0 
150  1 
20  0 
0  0 
14  0 
145  0 
0  0 
0  0 
4  0 
19  0 
11  0 
26  0 
196  0 
0  0 
125  3 
15  0 
342  2 
25  0 
218  4 
60  1 
7  0 
12  0 
0  0 
592  4 
6  0 
0  0 
97  0 
92  2 
117  2 
23  0 
66  0 
2,442  19 

































Nore: H = host government, T  = third party, A = affiliate. 
forward  against  future  U.S.  tax  obligations.  Thus,  the  incentives  for 
transfer-price manipulation described above are present even when foreign 
taxes are creditable against U.S.  taxes.5 
Because the comparison we  undertake  is so straightforward, we  do not 
present a formal theoretical model of transfer pricing in this paper. A model 
that integrates some features of  the theoretical literature in this area can be 
found in Eden (1985),  where it is demonstrated that tariff rates, as well as 
corporate  tax  rates,  can  influence  transfer-price  decisions.  Although  the 130  Jean-Thomas Bernard/Robert J. Weiner 
United States has imposed a tariff  on crude oil imports since  1973 (when it 
switched from a quota), the tariff is very small ($0.20/barrel,  corresponding 
to a rate of roughly  1 percent) and is neglected in our analysis. 
Transfer  prices  can  also  serve  purposes  other  than  reduction  of  tax 
obligations (e.g., providing signals for managerial incentives within the firm; 
see  Eccles  1985).  These  other  considerations  will  confound  efforts  to 
examine  hypotheses  regarding  tax  factors  only  if  they  vary  systematically 
with tax rates, which appears unlikely. 
The scope for multinational  firms to set transfer prices to minimize their 
tax obligations is constrained by the tax regulations of their home and host 
countries and by the ability of the tax authorities to enforce these regulations. 
In the United  States, the relevant  regulation  is  Section 482 of  the Internal 
Revenue  Code,  which  requires  that  transfer  prices  be  set at arm’s length 
prices.  The regulations  acknowledge  the  difficulty  often  involved  in  the 
establishment  of  arm’s  length  prices.  Section  482  specifies  that,  if 
“comparable”  third-party  transactions  exist,  then  they  must  be  used  in 
determining  arm’s  length  prices.  Firms  have  considerable  discretion  in 
deciding  what  constitutes  “comparable,”  however.  In  the  event  that  no 
comparable  transaction exist,  firms are instructed to choose, in descending 
hierarchy,  the “resale  price”  method (which uses downstream arm’s length 
prices  to impute upstream  transfer prices),  the  “cost-plus”  method, or any 
other  pricing  method  that  can  be  justified  to  the  IRS.6  Using  FTC 
line-of-business data for 1975, Benvignati  (1985) estimated that 24 percent 
of  transfer prices set for goods exported from the United States to affiliates 
abroad  were  established  using  the  comparable-third-party  and  resale-price 
methods, 57 percent using the cost-plus method,  and 19 percent using other 
methods. Unfortunately, the FTC  data do not cover interaffiliate imports into 
the  United  States.  In  contrast,  the  breakdown  for  interaffiliate  transfers 
within the United States (where tax considerations do not enter) in 1975 was 
49  percent  comparable-third-party  and  resale-price  methods,  29  percent 
cost-plus method,  and 22 percent other methods. 
The null  hypothesis  here  is that the  U.S. tax  authorities  are sufficiently 
knowledgeable  about the  arm’s length  market  in crude  oil and  sufficiently 
capable at enforcing transfer-price regulations that MNCs are obliged to set 
the  prices  for their  interaffiliate  transactions  equal to prices  prevailing  for 
third-party  transactions.  As noted  above, the  heterogeneity  of  the  product 
and  third-party  contract  terms  will  tend  to  complicate  efforts to  establish 
arm’s  length  prices  with  which  to  compare  a  firm’s  transfer  prices. 
However,  IRS  enforcement  of  the  arm’s  length  yardstick  need  not  be 
perfect  to  deter  the  practice  of  using  transfer  prices  to  avoid  taxes.  As 
detailed in Robbins and Stobaugh (1973), there are many channels through 
which MNCs  can shift funds between  affiliates besides  trade  transactions, 
including dividend payments,  loans, service fees and overhead charges, and 
royalties.  Depending  on the costs of  doing so, MNCs may  choose  one or 131  Multinationals, Transfer Prices, and Taxes 
more  of  these  other  channels  as  a  means  of  shifting  profits  among  tax 
jurisdictions. 
In  addition to testing for differences between arm’s length  and transfer 
prices, we examine below the hypothesis that MNCs transfer funds between 
tax jurisdictions  by  charging themselves above- or  below-market rates of 
interest on their credit transactions. The effective interest rates charged are 
imputed from the sensitivity of  f.0.b. prices to credit terms. The higher the 
effective interest rate,  the more  an  increase in  the number of  days credit 
should raise the purchase price.  In other words, the effective interest rate 
rises with d(price)ld(credit days). 
The hypothesis here is that U.S. multinationals would like their affiliates 
in  countries with  relatively low marginal corporate tax  rates to  “charge” 
high  interest rates  on  their  transfers to  affiliates in  countries where  such 
rates are relatively high, thereby tranfemng income to jurisdictions where it 
is taxed  more lightly.  Effective interest rates are of  course unobservable, 
but  this hypothesis can nonetheless be  tested  using  a two-step procedure 
similar  to  the  one  mentioned  above  for  prices.  The  first  step  is  a 
comparison of  regression coefficients for d(price)/d(credit days) for arm’s 
length  and  interaffiliate  transactions,  in  order  to  locate  significant  dif- 
ferences. The second is to relate any such differences to tax rates abroad. If 
MNCs are transferring funds in this manner, the correlation between foreign 
tax  rates and  “excess”  effective interest rates,  as measured  by:  d(price)l 
d(credit  days)interaffiliate  -  d(price)/d(credit  days)third.partyr  should  be  neg- 
ative. 
The  statistical  work  below  constitutes  the  first  systematic test  of  the 
effectiveness of  transfer-price regulations. Scattered indirect evidence sug- 
gests that the IRS is active in attempting to enforce Section 482. Plasschaert 
(1979)  reports  that,  in  1968-69,  the  IRS  investigated  871  cases  of 
international interaffiliate transactions. The largest number (roughly a third 
of  the  total)  of  potential  adjustments  concerned  transfer  prices  in  trade 
transactions.  Only  26.9  percent  of  the  adjustments  were  actually imple- 
mented, but those that were involved fairly large dollar figures. According to 
Plasschaert,  two-thirds of  the firms surveyed by  the Conference Board in 
1970 and 1971 have been subject to adjustments under Section 482. 
4.3  Empirical Tests 
Our  objectives  for  the  empirical  work  are  three.  First,  we  want  to 
determine whether  interaffiliate prices and  third-party prices differ signifi- 
cantly, in both an economic and  a statistical sense,  and whether any such 
differences vary systematically over time. Second, we  wish to identify the 
exporting countries, if  any, that exhibit such differences. Our final desire is 
to relate any country-specific differences we find to tax rates in oil-exporting 
countries. 132  Jean-Thomas BernardMobert J. Weiner 
The approach that we adopt is as follows. We  conduct OLS regressions 
with  the  purchase price  as the dependent variable.  Crude oil transactions 
have  traditionally  been  conducted  on  an  f.0.b.  basis,  and,  with  a  few 
exceptions, our purchase price data are quoted f.0.b. point of  export.'  To 
control for any systematic differences in prices caused by  factors other than 
the relation between  parties  in  the  transaction,  the  following explanatory 
variables are included: gravity, sulfur content, size of  shipment, and dummy 
variables for spot transactions, port of entry into the United States (East and 
Gulf Coasts, West Coast, Hawaii, Guam, and unknown), and credit terms. 
Separate regressions were run for each year, both because the effect of the 
control variables on price is likely to vary with changing conditions in the oil 
market  over time and  because we  are interested in  changes over time in 
differences between third-party and transfer prices, for the reasons discussed 
above.'  A  dummy variable is used  for each loading month to control for 
intrayear fluctuations in oil prices. 
To  conduct hypothesis tests,  we  include  separate dummy variables for 
each  transaction  type  (interaffiliate  transfer,  third-party  purchase,  host- 
government purchase) for each country that exported crude oil to the United 
States  in  a  given  year.'  We  test  whether  the  regression  coefficients for 
third-party  transactions  and  interaffiliate  transfers  are  equal  for  each 
exporting country. In  equation form,  the null  hypothesis is tij -  aij = 0, 
i  = 1, . . . ,  qj, where  tij and  aij are  the  regression  coefficients on  the 
third-party and interaffiliate dummy variables for country i in the regression 
for yearj, and qj is the number of  countries that exported crude oil to the 
United States in year j  through both these transaction types." 
The standard technique for testing the null hypothesis that the qj length 
vector tj - aj = 0 is to construct an F-ratio based on the  squared errors 
from the constrained (the constraints being the equality of  all the tj and aj 
coefficients) and  the unconstrained regressions.  Here,  we  use  instead  the 
Bonferroni  t-test  (as  described  in  Savin  1980),  which  rejects  the  null 
hypothesis at  the  a-level  if  any  of  the  qj t-values  for  the  difference  in 
coefficients exceeds the t, critical point in absolute value. The reasons for 
using the Bonferroni t-test are two. First, the standard F-test can reject the 
null hypothesis at the a-level even when none of the tj - aj coefficients differ 
significantly from zero at the a-level, a result that is not  meaningful here 
because  we  are  primarily  interested  not  in  whether  the  restrictions  are 
accepted universally but rather in where the violations of  these restrictions 
arise. The second reason is that the Bonferroni t-test indicates which of  the 
coefficients in the  vector tJ - aj cause the rejection of  the null  hypothesis 
when it is rejected, whereas the F-test does not. 
The difficulty with the Bonferroni t-test is that the distribution of  the test 
statistic  B = max,ltijl  is  not  easily  calculated  because  the  tij's  are  not 
independent. It should be intuitively clear, however, that rejection of the null 
hypothesis at the a-level entails using a critical t-value at a level smaller than 133  Multinationals, Transfer  Prices, and Taxes 
01  if  more  than  one  t-value  is  being  calculated.  Although  the  exact 
distribution of B will not in general be known, Savin (1980) shows that using 
a  critical  level  of  a/qj for  the  qj  individual  rij's  will  result  in  the  test's 
rejecting the null hypothesis at a level 5  01."  In this paper, we use the levels 
01  = .05 and 01  = .lo;  our qj's vary from year to year but are around twenty 
exporters, so that the individual t-statistics must exceed the critical value (for 
the two-tailed test with a large number of degrees of freedom, so that we use 
the standard normal distribution to approximate) t.0025 = 3.03, r.oos  = 2.81. 
Canada  is  treated  separately  on  the  grounds  that  Canadian  crude  oil 
shipments enter the United States via pipeline, primarily in the North Central 
region  (Indiana  to  Montana),  where  there  is  relatively  little  immediate 
competition with other foreign sources of  crude oil, which are shipped by 
tanker  to  the  U.S.  East,  West,  and  Gulf  coasts.I2 Otherwise,  the  same 
regression model is applied to Canadian data. 
An illustrative example for 1981 of  the overall regression results appears 
in table 4.3. The dummy variables have been chosen so that the constant 
represents the average price paid to the Venezuelan government for crude oil 
shipped to the East Coast during the month of January with zero credit days. 
American  Petroleum  Institute  (API)  gravity  and  sulfur  content  have  the 
expected positive and negative signs, respectively. This result is quite robust 
over time. Volume or size of  shipment displays an expected negative sign 
owing  to  size  discount;  however,  this  result  is  far  from  robust  as  the 
coefficients turn out to be significantly positive for a number of  years. As 
expected,  the  spot  transaction  variable  yields  a  mixture  of  positive  and 
negative signs over the sample period. Although this is not the case in 1981, 
oil  delivered  to  the  West  Coast  is  usually  significantly cheaper  than  oil 
delivered to the East Coast owing to the added cost of  moving oil south of 
Africa  or  through  the  Panama  Canal.  The  dummy  variables for  loading 
month display a pattern of falling prices in 198  1. 
The variable for credit days was introduced in the years for which data are 
available (1979-84)  with  the  intent of  measuring  an  implicit interest rate 
across transaction types,  as  explained above.  Unfortunately, no  coherent 
inference can be made, as can be seen from the 1981 result. It was expected 
that  the  average purchase price increases with  the  number of  credit days 
owing  to  the  implicit  loan.  Furthermore,  affiliates may  want  to  charge 
implicit interest rates different from market interest rates in order to realize 
money transfers.  Unfortunately, the data reveal no  definite pattern  in  this 
respect,  although  some  coefficients of  the  variables  for  credit  days  are 
statistically significant. 
The last group of  explanatory variables is based on transaction type by 
country. It yields the annual average price differential associated with  the 
type of transaction. Table 4.3 shows that, with two exceptions, crude oil sold 
by the Venezuelan government was the cheapest crude oil imported into the 
United States.I3 Using the estimated coefficients reported in table 4.3 and 134  Jean-Thomas BernardRobert J. Weiner 
Table 4.3  OLS Regression Results for 1981 
Estimated Coefficients and Standard Errors" 
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Table 4.3 (continued) 
Estimated Coefficients and Standard Errors” 
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All Countries 
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Table 4.3 (continued) 
Estimated Coefficients and Standard Errors” 















,185  -9.098 
,187  -10.634 
,179  - 12.864 
,188  - 13.593 
.I90  -13.716 
,195  -12.162 
.I88  -11.675 














































































a The dependent variable is purchase price. The number of observations is 2,942.  The adjusted 
RZ  is  ,787. 
indicate significance levels of  5 percent and  10 percent,  respectively, according to the 
Bonferroni test, i.e., greater than 3.00 and 2.79,  respectively, in absolute value. 
and 
the  estimated  variance-covariance  matrix, the average price  ‘  ‘differential’ ’ 
(defined  as  the  difference,  corrected  for  the  control  variables)  between 
third-party and affiliate transactions is calculated for each country along with 
the pertinent standard error and t-statistic.  The results are reproduced  at the 
bottom  of  table  4.3. A  positive  value  implies that  prices  for transactions 
through  affiliates  were  lower  than  those  for  transactions  through  third 
parties.  A  negative  value  implies  the  reverse.  Recalling  the  discussion 
above,  differentials  motivated  by  tax  considerations  should  be  positive. 
Table  4.3 shows  that  the  two  prices  were  statistically  different  at  the  5 137  Multinationals, Transfer Prices, and Taxes 
percent  significance level  for Abu  Dhabi,  Libya,  Nigeria,  Saudi Arabia, 
Trinidad, and Venezuela and at the 10 percent level for Mexico but that only 
three  of  the  significant  differentials have  the  sign  predicted  by  the  tax 
motivation hypothesis.  l4 
Table 4.4 provides a summary of the results from the annual regressions. Only 
the price differentials that are statistically significant at the 10 percent level are 
shown.I5 No  price differential is statistically significant in  1983, so the null 
hypothesis of  no  difference  is  not  rejected  for  that  year  according to  the 
Bonferroni procedure.  The  null  hypothesis  is  rejected  for  all  other  years. 
Countries are separated into two groups, with the first including major exporting 
countries, which contributed 5 percent or more of all U.S. crude oil imports in a 
particular year and the second, all other smaller oil-exporting countries. 
If  attention is  centered on the  major oil-exporting countries only,  it  is 
possible to observe specific patterns over time and for individual countries. 
From  1973  to  1975,  when  major  oil-exporting  countries  had  yet  to 
nationalize completely their oil  production,  all  average price  differentials 
were negative, with one exception, Algeria in 1973. From 1982 to  1984, all 
price  differentials are  positive,  with  Indonesia  in  1984 being  the  single 
exception.  Between  these  two  periods,  the  results  are  mixed.  At  the 
individual country level, Indonesia shows negative price differentials for all 
years except 1978. Saudi Arabia has only positive price differentials, while 
Venezuela has negative price differentials before nationalization, in 1973 and 
1974, and  positive price differentials from  1979 to  1984 after nationaliza- 
tion. It should be pointed out that average price differentials were unusually 
large in favor of  interaffiliate transactions in  1979.16  This can be explained 
by the 1979 oil price surge, with interaffiliate prices being adjusted slowly. 
When  prices  are  higher  for  transactions through  affiliates  than  prices 
through  third  parties  (assumed  to  represent  market  prices),  or,  in  other 
words, when price differentials are negative, money is transferred from the 
United States to other countries. The converse occurs with positive price 
differentials. To  get  an  idea  of  the  relative importance of  these  money 
transfers within affiliated parties,  the statistically significant differences in 
prices  reported  in  table  4.4  were  multiplied  by  the  number  of  barrels 
imported by  affiliated parties.  The results appear in table 4.5, which also 
shows the total  value of  oil imported by  affiliated parties,  and of  all oil 
imports. With the exception of the first two years and the last one, more 
money was flowing into the United States than out. The gross money transfer 
represents less than 2 percent of  the value of  crude oil imported into the 
United States by  affiliated parties,  with  1979 being an exception, and  an 
even smaller percentage of  all crude oil imports. 
The data base includes information on both the purchase price and  the 
price of oil at the port of  entry, the difference being transportation costs. 
There is no information on the ownership of  tankers (or pipelines) carrying 
crude oil to the American port of entry, nor is there information about which Table 4.4  Differences between Third-Party and Affiliate Prices 
1984  1983  1982  1981  1980  1979  1978  1977  1976  1975  1974  1973 
Major countries exporting oil to the United States: 
Algeria  l.OFb  -  - 
Canada  .27b  -  4.09" 
Indonesia  -1.13a'b  -  - 
Iran  -  -  - 
Libya  - 
Mexico  -  -  ~ 
Nigeria  -  -  - 
Saudi Arabia  -  -  - 
United Kingdom  -  -  - 
Venezuela  .87b  1  .69a 
Other countries exporting oil to the United States: 
Abu Dhabi  -  -  - 
Angola  - 
Bolivia 
Brunei  - 
Cameroon  -  -  - 
China  -  - 
Congo  -  - 
Duhai  - 
-  - 
-  .37" 





-  1 .60".b 
- 
- 
-  1.02 
- 
- 
-  1.38" 
-  .  15a'b 
. 1  2a,b 
- 
-  1  .04a 








-  2.03a'b 
-  1.3Ib 




-  I .42a'b 
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-  .71 
-  1.82" 
.85 
1816 
.85  .88 











-  - 
-3.51"  10.24a 
-  9.33" 
- 
-  -  8.47" 
- 
-  - 
-  6.62 
-  3.35"  7.81" 
-  - 
.80  .74 
3979  4480 
-  - 
1.62" 
-  - 
.36a  .73a 
.85  .83 
5039  4573 
2.42"  2.46a 
.73  .47  .7  1 
3412  3266  659 
Noret  A dash indicates that the differential between T and A is not significant at the 10 percent level (according to the Bonferroni test, except for Canada, to which the usual 
t-test is applied); a blank space indicates insufficient data to estimate coefficients for both T and A. a indicates a difference significant at the 5 percent level.  indicates a 
country that accounts for at least 5 percent of U.S. imports in the given year. Table 4.5  Value of Differences between Third-Party and Affiliate Prices (million $) 
1984  1983  1982  1981  1980  1979  1978  1977  1976  1975  1974  1973 
Major countries exporting oil to the United States: 
Algeria  11.8 
Canada  10.0  182.7 












Other countries exporting oil to the United States: 
-35.0 
-  138.3 
-  115.6 





-  15.4 
25.3  -41.7  -29.1 
19.0  -21.1  -56.7  -52.1 
119.1  16.4 
26.9 
-  17.7  50.0 
87.1  209.1  131.2 
73.9  - 
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-35.7 











Summation ( +  ) 
% total type A 
% total imports 
% total type A 
% total imports 
Summation ( -  ) 























14,003.8  23,769.3 
33,758.6  38,733.1 
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244.7  -12.0  5.8  4.4 
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-67.5  -221.0 
.6  2.3 
.4  1.5 
1  1,446.2  9,490.6 
17,302.7  14,948.8 









Nore:  + and - indicate the sum of  all the positive and negative numbers that are significant at the  10 percent level 142  Jean-Thomas Bernard/Robert J. Weiner 
countries  ultimately  received  the money  spent on transportation. Neverthe- 
less, transportation  fees form another channel that could be used to transfer 
money  into or out  of  the  United  States. In spite  of  the incomplete  infor- 
mation, an analysis similar to that described  above for crude oil prices was 
applied  to  transportation  costs  in  order  to  test  whether  the  latter  differ 
between third-party  and affiliate transactions. l7 
Table 4.6 displays the summary results with respect to differences between 
transportation  costs of  third-party  and  affiliate transactions.  No  systematic 
differences  over  the  years  seem  evident,  but  some  individual  countries 
display definite patterns: Algeria (positive), Iran (negative), Libya (positive), 
Mexico  (positive),  Saudi  Arabia  (negative),  Angola  (positive),  Egypt 
(negative), and Norway (positive). Table 4.7 shows the money transfers that 
result from affiliates paying  significantly different  transportation  costs than 
third parties. These transfers represent less than 1 percent of the value of oil 
imported into the United States by affiliated parties. 
4.4  Tax Effects 
As  shown in  tables  4.4  and 4.6,  third-party  and  interaffiliate  purchase 
price and transportation  cost differentials  display  specific patterns  for some 
countries. What are the relations  between these estimated  patterns  and  the 
host  country tax  regimes?  Oil  taxation  in  each country of  interest  and its 
evolution over time are highly complex and cannot easily be summarized in 
a few general statements (see Kemp 1987). Furthermore, it is difficult to put 
together  a  set of  statistical  information  on this  matter  that  displays  con- 
sistency  over time.  Since our interest  lies  in  transfer  pricing  between  af- 
filiated  parties, our objective is to find an indicator  of  the  fiscal treatment 
granted to an additional  dollar of  oil production  income by host countries. 
The higher the marginal  oil income tax  rate, the greater is the incentive  to 
reduce reported taxable income in a particular country, regardless of  whether 
the marginal tax rate is higher than the home country (U.S.) tax rate.”  Since 
marginal  tax  rates  are  not  readily  available,  we  have  to rely  on  average 
effective tax rates prevailing abroad. The average effective income tax rate is 
defined as the ratio of income tax paid or accrued to taxable income based on 
measures  that  would  normally  be  acceptable  to  the  IRS.  The  average 
effective income tax rate may be a poor indicator of  the marginal rate when 
the latter is increasing  (understatement)  or decreasing  (overstatement).  It is 
possible  to have  a  situation  where  the  average  tax  rate  is  high  and  the 
marginal rate is nil, as was the case when the income tax paid was based on 
the posted prices (see U.S. Congress 1977). 
Average effective income tax rates are displayed in table 4.8 but should be 
interpreted  with great care. The main statistical sources are as follows. The 
tax and income data for even years up to 1982 are taken from various issues 
of Statistics of  Income put out by the IRS; the data for 1977 and 1982 come 143  Multinationals, Transfer Prices, and Taxes 
from the benchmark survey of  the U.S. Department of Commerce on U.S. 
direct investment abroad. Smith (1987) presents a few figures for 1983, and, 
finally, some judgment was applied to make interpolations or extrapolations. 
We  are left with a number of missing observations. The salient feature of the 
average effective tax rates as shown in table 4.8 is that they are high, both in 
absolute terms and relative to U.S. statutory income tax rates over the same 
period.20 Furthermore,  the  effective  income  tax  rate  of  U.S.  parents  of 
foreign oil affiliates, computed in a similar fashion, was 0.30 in 1982 (U.S. 
Department of  Commerce 1985, table iii.M. 1); only Mexico was character- 
ized by  a lower figure. No overall time trends are evident; some countries, 
such as Canada, Egypt, and Nigeria, display upward trends, while others, 
such as Ecuador, Indonesia and Kuwait, show downward trends. 
What is the relation between third-party and interaffiliate purchase price 
and  transportation  cost  differentials,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  average 
effective  income  tax  rates,  on  the  other?  For  purchase  price,  the 
transfer-pricing hypothesis states that interaffiliates would like to set a lower 
price  in  high-tax  host  countries relative to  third-party transactions, hence 
generating high positive price differentials. As for transportation cost, a high 
effective tax rate should induce integrated companies to take income out of 
the  oil-producing host  country, possibly  into  the  home  country, or  more 
likely  into  a  tax-haven  country  through  a  flag-of-convenience shipping 
affiliate. This would result in more of  the oil acquisition cost being in the 
form of transportation cost and hence increase transportation cost relative to 
third parties. 
Along with these two transfer-pricing hypotheses, our objective is to check 
whether significant structural breaks occurred between the early part of  the 
sampling  period  and  the  latter  part,  when  a  number  of  oil-producing 
countries had  taken  over  oil  production  and  when  the  IRS  improved  its 
ability to monitor U.S. oil companies operating abroad. 
To  test for the influence of  effective income tax rates on affiliate pricing 
behavior  and  for  possible  structural changes,  regressions  were  run,  with 
average  effective  tax  rate  as  the  explanatory  variable  and  differentials 
between third-party and affiliate prices (as shown, e.g., at the end of  table 
4.3)  as  the  dependent  variable,  for  two  subperiods,  1975-78  and 
1980-84.21  Each  observation is  weighted  by  the  inverse of  the  standard 
error of the estimated third-party/affiliate differential to take into account the 
precision of  the  information.  Only  observations for  which  tax  rates  and 
estimated price differentials are both available are used. 
Table  4.9 presents the summary regression results. The relation between 
the two sets of variables is at best tenuous. There appears to be no significant 
relation between third-party and affiliate estimated purchase price differen- 
tials  and  average effective income tax rates in both  subperiods. Estimated 
transportation  cost  differentials,  on  the  other  hand,  show  the  predicted 
negative relation with tax rates, significantly so in the first subperiod and a Table 4.6  Differences between Third-Party and Affiliate Transportation Costs 
1984  1983  1982  1981  1980  1979  1978  1977  1976  1975  1974  1973 
Major countries exporting oil to the United States: 
Algeria  -  -  - 
Canada  -  .15".b  -  .4aa 
Indonesia  -  4a.b  -  .50a,b 
Iran  -  1. loa  -  .80"  -1.58" 
Libya  - 
Mexico  -  .41a.b  - 
Nigeria  -  .29b  -  - 
Saudi Arabia  -  .37a.b  -  .29*.b  - 
United Kingdom  -  -  - 
Venezuela  -  - 
Abu Dhabi  - 
Angola  -  -  - 
Bolivia 
Brunei  - 
Cameroon  -  -  - 
China  -  - 
Congo  -  - 
Dubai  - 
Other countries exporting oil to the United States: 
-  -  1.64" 
-  .41".b 




-  .23a'b 
- 
- 
.  39a 
-  .78" 
- 
- 
.2Yb  .26a.b  .20".b 
-  1.40  -  .94" 
.15a.b  - 
-  -  .  15b 
.19a,b  - 
-  - 
.25a,b  - 
.45"  - 
-  ,46a.b  -  ,34a.b 









-  .73a.b 
-  .56a 
.95" 
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-  -  - 
-1.12"  -1.41a  -2.61" 
.5 1 
1816 
.46  .49  .47 
2228  2238  2942 
-  .34" 
.51" 
.44  .50 
4480  4729 
- 
-  1.93" 










-  1.08" 










.29  .54  .49 
3412  3266  659 
Nore; A dash indicates that the difference between T and A is not significant at the 10 percent level (according to the Bonferroni test, except for Canada, to which the usual 
t-test is applied); a blank space indicates insufficient data to estimate coefficients for both T and A. a indicates a difference significant at the 5 percent level.  indicates a 
country that accounts for at least 5 percent of U.S. imports in the given year. Table 4.7  Value of Differences between Third-Party and Affiliate Transportation Costs (million $) 
1984  1983  1982  1981  1980  1979  1978  1977  1976  1975  1974  1973 
Major countries exporting oil to the United States: 
Algeria 
Canada  -5.6  21.4 
Indonesia  -31.1  41.7 
Libya 
Mexico  16.9 
Nigeria  -  6.6 
Saudi Arabia  -10.3  -23.0 
United Kingdom 
Venezuela 
Iran  -7.8  -17.1  -  6.5 
Other countries exporting oil to the United States: 









-  353.9 
6.6 
-  27.5 
21.2  23.0  25.5 
12.4 
28.3  -  29.3 
-47.2  28.3 
83.2  56.0  33.8 
97.1 




9.9  4.0 
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-10.4  -87.2  -33.3 
16.5  -20.4 
28.5 









Summation ( +  ) 
% imports type A 
% total imports 
% total type A 
% total imports 
Summation ( -  ) 
Total type. A 
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-  8.0 
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-  153.3 
35.4 
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-268.3  -  108.2 
2.3  1.1 
1.6  .7 
11,446.2  9,490.6  869.1 
17,302.7  14,948.8  1,343.6 
Note: + and - indicate the sum of  all the positive and negative numbers that are significant at the  10 percent level. Table 4.8  Average Effective Tax Rates for the U.S. Petroleum Industry Abroad (%) 
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Table 4.9  Empirical Results: Relations between Third-Party/Affiliate 
Differentials and Tax Rates 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  f-statistic 
1973-78: 
Dependent variable: purchase-price differential:" 
Constant  ,057 
Tax  rate  -  .039 
Dependent variable: transportation-cost  differential:b 
Constant  ,241 
Tax rate  -  ,268 
1980-84: 
Dependent variable: purchase-price differential:" 
Constant  ,179 
Tax  rate  ~  .295 
Dependent variable: transportation-cost  differential:d 
Constant  .253 










-  .499 
2.746 
-  2.668 
,463 
-  ,546 
1.466 
-  1.587 
Note:  All variables are normalized by  the appropriate estimated purchase-price (transportation- 
cost) differential standard error. 
"N  = 78. R2 = ,019. R2 (adjusted) =  -.007. 
bN = 78. R2 = .091. R2 (adjusted) = .067. 
'N = 66. R2 = ,005. RZ  (adjusted) =  -.026. 
*N  = 66. R2 = .039. RZ  (adjusted) = ,009. 
weaker  relation  in the second one. To  probe  this relation  further, attention 
was  centered  on  the  year  1976,  which  had  the  most  extensive  set  of 
information on individual  country  effective oil income tax rates. Spearman 
rank correlations  between third-party  and affiliate estimated  purchase  price 
(and transportation  cost) differentials  and effective income tax rates2'  were 
computed  in an attempt  to reduce the influence of  measurement  errors. As 
can be seen from table 4.10, the price differential/effective  income tax rate 
rank correlation yields, as predicted, a positive value, 0.34, with a standard 
error of  0.23,  while  the  transportation cost/effective  income tax  rate  rank 
correlation is negative,  as predicted, and equal to -0.14 with a standard error 
of  0.23.  The  first  estimated  rank  correlation  coefficient  is  significantly 
different from zero at the 10 percent level, while the second is not.23 Taken 
together, the regression  and rank correlation  results provide only very weak 
support  for  an  influence  of  effective  income  tax  rate  on  transfer  prices 
between affiliated parties. 
4.5  Conclusion 
In general, multinational corporations can reduce their tax obligations  by 
setting transfer prices that differ from arm's length prices. Their ability to do 151  Multinationals, Transfer Prices, and Taxes 
Table 4.10  Rank Correlation: Relations between Third-Party/Aflliate 





Purchase-price differential/tax rate 
Transportation-cost differentialltax rate 
,339 
-  ,145 
Note:  The twenty-two observations are normalized by the appropriate estimated purchase-price 
(transportation-cost) differential standard error. 
so is constrained by  tax regulations in their home and host countries. The 
effectiveness of  these regulations, however, is not easily determined. 
In this paper, we have conducted the first systematic empirical analysis of 
transfer prices. The industry we have studied, petroleum, has a long history 
of tax-motivated transfer pricing. Even after the changes in the tax treatment 
of the industry in the mid-l970s, there have been allegations of transfer-price 
abuse, but little in the way of hard evidence. 
Our findings indicate that there are systematic differences between transfer 
and  arm’s  length  prices  for  many  exporting  countries.  Some  of  these 
countries exhibit consistent patterns over time, but others do not. Moreover, 
the relation between transfer-price/arm’s length-price  differentials and corp- 
orate tax  rates  appears to  be  weak.  There  are  at  least  four possible  hy- 
potheses for this. First, the nature and enforcement of IRS regulations may 
be  so  effective  that  companies  are  precluded  from  reducing  their  tax 
obligations through transfer pricing. Second, it may be easier to avoid taxes 
through  other  channels.  Third,  transfer  prices  may  serve  a  primarily 
managerial role within the firm,  as described by Eccles (1985) and Robbins 
and Stobaugh (1973).24 Finally, marginal and average effective tax rates may 
be sufficiently different as to prevent identification of  any relation between 
the  former  and  transfer-pricing  behavior.  These  hypotheses  are  not  all 
mutually exclusive,  and untangling them is unlikely  to prove  easy. While 
this study represents a step in the empirical analysis of transfer pricing, it is 
clear that much work remains to be done in this area. 
Notes 
1.  Briefly, this practice arose out of  U.S. foreign policy goals in the Middle East 
following World War 11. The practice began with the establishment of an income tax 
on petroleum  company profits by  Saudi Arabia  in  1950. The IRS  issued  a ruling 
accepting the deductibility of this tax against U.S. income tax in 1955. In the 1960s, 
market  prices  for  crude  oil  declined,  but  transfer  prices,  called  “posted,”  or 152  Jean-Thomas Bernardkobert J. Weiner 
“tax-reference,”  prices  (used  in  determining  petroleum  companies  taxes  paid  to 
oil-producing  countries),  did  not,  effectively  increasing  transfers  from  the  U.S. 
Treasury  to  foreign  governments  (for  details,  see  U.S.  Congress  1977; for  an 
economic analysis, see Jenkins and Wright  1975). 
In the mid-1970s foreign crude oil reserves (except in Canada) were nationalized, 
limiting the ability of U.S.  multinationals to claim payments to foreign governments 
as creditable  against  U.S.  income tax.  The rules  on deductibility  of  foreign taxes 
were tightened by the U.S. Tax Reduction Act of  1975 and the Tax Reform Act of 
1976. McDaniel and Ault (1977) summarize these changes. 
2.  The primary use of the data in Anderson (1988) was to adjust crude oil import 
prices for quality. Weiner (1986) used the data to test hypotheses about contracting 
and spot trading. 
3.  Reporting of  the data by  firms that import crude oil into the United States is 
mandatory under the U.S. Federal Administration  Act (1974) and the U.S. Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act (1975), which were part of the basis for U.S. domestic 
crude oil price regulation.  We  were unable to find out whether these data were the 
same as those reported  to the IRS.  However, these regulations did not provide  an 
incentive for misreporting transfer prices of imported crude oil (for a description and 
analysis of U.S. petroleum regulation  in the  1970s, see Kalt  1981), and it appears 
unlikely that MNCs maintained separate accounting systems for the DOE in addition 
to their tax and managerial systems. Since the U.S. deregulation of crude oil prices in 
1981, the data have been collected for statistical purposes only. The reporting form 
was not changed until late  1984, after which the information  we  use here  was no 
longer requested. 
4.  Firms  are  not  required  to  report  in  months  in  which  they  import  less  than 
500,000  barrels  into the United  States.  In  comparison, crude oil  imports into the 
United States averaged roughly 200 million barrels per month during this period. The 
data base covers approximately 90 percent of U.S. crude oil imports. 
5. The MNC’s U.S.  tax credits and liabilities are incurred immediately when its 
foreign affiliates are organized as branches rather than separately incorporated abroad 
as  subsidiaries.  Most  U.S.  petroleum  MNCs  organize  their  foreign  operations  as 
branches,  implying that the transfer-price incentive discussed in the text is relevant 
only when $ > tUs.  As indicated below, this is always the case in our data. 
6. For a more detailed description,  see Plasschaert (1979). 
7.  The data base contains landed as well as f.0.b.  prices. Shipments for which the 
two prices were equal were assumed to change hands on a c.i.f. basis and were not 
used in the regressions. 
8.  Shipments that loaded in one year and landed in the next were counted in the 
loading year. An alternative to conducting annual regressions would have been to run 
one regression with interaction terms to allow for changes over time. The data base 
contains so many observations (see table 4.4 below) that there is little to be gained 
from pooling years for additional degrees of freedom. 
9.  Not every country exported through every transaction type every year. Dummy 
variables are omitted in cases where no transactions from a given country of a given 
type exist. 
10.  Transaction  type  variables  could  be  considered  to  represent  endogenous 
choice, thus leading to biased coefficient estimates. A logit test using transaction type 
as  dependent  variable  and  effective  tax  rates,  described  later  on,  as  explanatory 
variables was performed, and it showed no significant relation  between transaction 
type and country-specific effective tax rates. 
,  P(Ef), 
where Ej  stands for event i and Ef  for the complement of event i, gives this result. As 
an example, suppose that the events E,, E, are that the ?-statistics associated with two 
11.  Applying  the  Bonferroni  inequality  P(E,, . . . ,  Em) 5  1 - 153  Multinationals, Transfer Prices, and Taxes 
regression coefficients are in the acceptance region for the null hypothesis. Then the 
5 .05 level test of both being in the acceptance region  is that each is in the  .025 
acceptance region.  In  comparison, if  the two t-statistics are  independent,  then  the 
exact  distribution  of  B  can  be  calculated;  a  .025 level  test  on each  coefficient is 
equivalent to a  1 - (1  - .025)’ = .0494 level test of the null hypothesis. 
12. The null hypothesis that Canadian data fit the overall regression is rejected at 
conventional significance levels. 
13. The exceptions are China (transaction type T) and Venezuela (transaction type 
A), but neither is statistically significant at conventional levels. 
14. The suggestion has been  made that transaction A prices may follow closely 
transaction H  prices, thus indicating that affiliates set oil prices at the level set by 
their host government. The Bonferroni test leads to a rejection, at the 5 percent level, 
of the hypothesis of no price differentials between transactions types A and H. 
15.  In addition,  the differences that are significantly different from zero at the 5 
percent level are so indicated. 
16. Malaysia is the exception. 
17. These  regressions  omit  the  explanatory  variables  API  gravity,  sulfur,  and 
credit days. 
18. The  result  that  the  United  States  has  received  relatively  small  net  inflows 
differs markedly from that of  Jenkins and Wright (1975) for the period before our 
data start. 
19.  See the  discussion  earlier  in the paper.  For a summary of U.S.  taxation of 
income earned abroad, see Hines (1988a). 
20.  Average effective tax rates greater than one reflect the fact that the tax base 
used by the IRS for foreign operations of U.S.  companies differs from the tax base as 
defined by other governments. 
21.  As can be seen in table 4.4, the price differentials for 1979 are very large. 
This is in part due to the disruption in the oil market, which resulted in rapid price 
changes.  Since  the  differentials  were  almost  certainly  affected,  we  have dropped 
1979 from the regressions. 
22.  Taking into account the standard error of the estimated differentials. 
23. The  approximate  distribution  for order  statistics  suggested  by  Kendall  and 
24. This hypothesis requires the additional, questionable  assumption  that it is too  costly 
Stuart (1967, sec. 31.19) is used to obtain the critical value. 
for the MNC to maintain separate accounting systems for managerial and tax purposes. 
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Comment  Lorraine Eden 
The  petroleum  industry  is  an  international  oligopoly,  consisting  of  four 
stages: extraction, shipping, refining, and distribution. The purpose of  the 
Bernard and Weiner paper is to test the effectiveness of  U.S. transfer price 
regulation at the extraction and shipping stages. The key variable in their 
analysis is “transaction type,” which consists of three main categories: U.S. 
imports from foreign affiliates (A), host governments (H), and third parties 
(T). The authors hypothesize that, over the 1973-84  period, U.S. petroleum 
multinationals (MNCs) underinvoiced crude oil exports from high-tax source 
countries into the  United States in  order to reduce overall tax  payments. 
Thus P(T) - P(A) should be positively related to t(Jf - t(US), where imports of 
A, H, and T come from country J, and t(J) is the marginal income tax rate in 
country J. In addition, MNCs may have also overinvoiced shipping charges. 
In many cases (see table 4.4), the authors do find significant transfer price 
manipulation (TPM); for example,  repeated overinvoicing through Nigeria 
and  Indonesia and  underinvoicing through  Saudi Arabia.  The peak  years 
appear to be  1976,  1977, and  1981. Overall,  there is net  underinvoicing, 
equal to less than 2 percent of the total value of  affiliate imports into the 
United States (dominated by  the large underinvoicing in 1979 by Adu Dhabi 
and in 1981 by Saudi Arabia [$527 million]). More significant differences in 
transport costs occur than in transfer prices (see table 4.6). In general, the 
reverse occurs: Nigeria, Libya,  and Algeria undercharge and Saudi Arabia 
overcharges; Indonesia is mixed. The total value of net shipping transfers is 
an  overcharge of  less than  1  percent of  affiliate imports  (dominated by  a 
huge overcharge by Saudi Arabia, also in  1981, of  $354 million). 
The  authors  conclude  that  little  manipulation  of  transfer  prices  and 
shipping charges occurred and that it was only weakly related to income tax 
differentials. Three rationales are offered for these results: the effectiveness 
of U.S. transfer price regulation, MNCs using other channels to avoid taxes, 
or problems related to using average tax rates to proxy for marginal rates. 
Since the authors have an unusually detailed data base and have performed 
the  most  rigorous  tests  of  TPM  to  date,  their  failure to  find  significant 
evidence of  transfer pricing in response to tax differentials is an important 
result and one that may be extensively cited. Their results clearly contradict 
the widely held view of substantial MNC price manipulation in the petroleum 
industry  (see  Jenkins  and  Wright  1975; Bertrand  1981). Therefore  it  is 
important to determine whether their conclusions are robust or confounded 
by  statistical problems. 
Lorraine Eden is associate professor in the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at 
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Since there are several issues involved, let me deal with them individually. 
The key issues are (1) how to measure transfer price manipulation, (2) the 
factors affecting TPM, and (3) the relevant income tax differential. 
How Should Transfer Price Manipulation Be Measured? 
Transfer price  manipulation has  a  different  meaning  in  the  theoretical 
MNC  literature than  in  government regulations.  Theoretical transfer price 
manipulation  (TTPM) is  measured  by  the gap  between  the  transfer price 
P(A) and the shadow price, the marginal cost of  the exporting firm (Eden 
1985). Regulatory  transfer price manipulation (RTPM) is measured by  the 
gap between P(A) and P(T),  the price at which the same product is sold to or 
bought  from an  unrelated buyer  (e.g.,  Sec. 482).  There  is no  reason for 
TTPM and RTPM to be the same or for one necessarily to imply the other 
(Eden 1989). 
In Bernard and Weiner, while the motivation for transfer pricing is based on 
theoretical models of TPM, the definition used in the tests is the regulatory one, 
P(T) -  P(A). However, the implicit reference hypothesis in the background 
must be that such an empirical gap does not also exist between P(T) and P(H) 
or between P(A) and P(H). If significant differences exist between these other 
pairs of prices, the evidence on RTPM is much less clear. In fact, the authors 
do find a significant differential between P(A) and P(H) (see n. 14); however, 
they do not report calculations for the third price gap. 
Related to this is another question as to the role played by  firm A in the 
host country. Prior to this time period, many countries nationalized their oil 
fields. In these cases, A acts as a middleman, supplying technical expertise 
in return  for crude petroleum,  so that P(H) should be  related to P(A).  In 
other countries, A extracts the oil from private fields, and P(H) represents an 
unrelated  price  like P(T);  or,  alternatively, P(H) may  be  a  posted  price. 
Given  note  14, the latter situation may  be  the representative one.  In  the 
absence of  information as to the share of  As  exports  (or of  T’s exports) 
purchased  from  the  host  government  relative  to  own  production,  it  is 
impossible to determine what these price gaps mean.  Hence, a significant 
P(T) -  P(A) gap may not indicate RTPM at all. 
In  addition,  the  value  of  price  manipulation  to  the  petroleum  multi- 
nationals depends on the relative shares of  their affiliates’ purchased versus 
produced crude oil. Bernard and Weiner find significant underinvoicing equal 
to 2 percent of  the value of  affiliate imports; however, if  much of  this was 
purchased rather than produced, the relevant denominator is value added, not 
sales. The underinvoicing percentage would therefore be  larger, implying 
more RTPM than first appears. 
What Factors Affect TPM? 
Eden (1989) explores the factors that affect TPM in a model of a vertically 
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most  petroleum  affiliates  were  organized  as  branches  in  order  to  take 
advantage of  deductible losses and U.S.  percentage depletion. In addition, 
most were taxed on an overall basis so that surplus and deficit foreign tax 
credits were pooled.  Eden finds that TTPM depends on differences in the 
statutory tax  rates,  days  of  credit,  the  host  country’s  pricing  policy  for 
calculating the income tax, and the importing government’s definition of an 
acceptable  transfer  price.  Under  posted  prices  (mostly  prior  to  1974, 
although data are unavailable), the  MNC  should theoretically overinvoice 
since a higher P(A)  does not affect host taxes. However, after 1978 the U.S. 
government disallowed crediting posted prices so that underinvoicing would 
be the preferred route,  given high  statutory rates abroad. Moreover, if  tax 
credits are pooled,  the relevant tax  rate  is the weighted  average statutory 
rate, not the tax rate where A is located. 
Even if  MKs  do not theoretically transfer price (i.e., assume that P(A) 
equals marginal cost), there are several reasons why P(A)  would not equal 
P(T): gravity and sulphur characteristics differ; number of credit days differs; 
per-unit transport costs vary; the MNC refinery may have monopsony power 
in the external market; there may be transactions costs associated with the 
external market; the posted price is different from the transfer price; statutory 
tax rates and method of foreign tax crediting differ; and royalties are charged 
by the host country. Bernard and Weiner control for the first three: days of 
credit, transport costs, and characteristics of  oil; but this is not sufficient to 
guarantee that P(T) equals P(A)  even if no TTPM occurs. 
What Tax Differential Should Be Used? 
Bernard and Weiner use t(J) - t(US), the difference between the average 
effective tax rate in the host country and in the United States to proxy for the 
tax  differential.  This  measure  is  problematic  on  both  theoretical  and 
empirical grounds. 
As  other papers in this volume show, statutory tax rates affect financial 
and transfer price decisions; marginal effective tax  rates affect real capital 
investment decisions. The relevant gap between the statutory rates depends 
on the organizational structure (brancWsubsidiary) of  the affiliate, deferral, 
whether  the  affiliate  has  a  surplus  or  deficit  of  foreign  tax  credits,  the 
per-country or overall limitation, the ability to carry tax credits forward and 
backward,  and  the  definition of  the tax  base  including the use of  posted 
prices (Eden 1989). Average tax rates on a per-country basis may therefore 
be  a poor proxy  for the relevant differential. And,  as pointed out earlier, 
other variables besides a tax gap affect RTPM. 
In Bernard and Weiner’s empirical work, the tax rates in table 4.8  used to 
calculate the tax differential are problematic for several reasons. First, most 
tax rates other than for the years  1976 and  1982 were determined by  the 
interpolations between 1976 and 1982 or were assumed to be constant (e.g., 
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using  interpolated rates may  have confounded the results in  table  4.9.  A 
more reliable test (although the number of cases falls substantially) would be 
to use  only  1976 and  1982 data.  Additional support for this is shown by 
table 4.1, where the foreign tax as a percentage of  U.S. taxable income falls 
from .8 to  .9 in the  1972-78  period and to  .6 in  1980-82.  Clearly, what 
happened was a shift of  foreign taxes from creditable to deductible status. 
This is also reflected in  the tax  credit as a percentage of  the foreign tax, 
which rises over the period. 
A second problem with the tax data is the elimination of  years without a 
tax rate.  Unfortunately, most of  the transfer pricing  was caused by  Saudi 
Arabia, which, owing to absence of  tax data, was excluded from the runs. 
Abu Dhabi, the other large manipulator, has tax rates that were interpolated 
for all but three years; its tax data are, therefore, not very reliable. 
A third problem is that  shipping charges are regressed against the same 
average tax  differential as transfer  prices.  This  is problematic because it 
assumes that the MNCs use shipping affiliates rather than independent firms 
and that both the shipping and the extraction affiliates are located in the same 
host country. Data are unavailable on either of  these issues. Assuming that 
the shipping affiliate is located elsewhere, under the overall limitation it is 
legitimate  to  use  a  foreign  statutory  rate  pooled  across  all  affiliates. 
However, that information is also not available. 
Finally, a vertically integrated petroleum MNC can take its profits at any 
stage; tight regulation of  the transfer price at one  stage may  simply shift 
profits  to  another  stage  or  by  means  of  another  form  (e.g.,  financial 
maneuvers). Given that the petroleum MNCs were forced to report prices of 
shipped crude oil, it is not surprising that the authors find little evidence of 
RTPM. The authors argue that the limited evidence of  RTPM implies the 
effectiveness of  government regulation; however, regulation  at  one  stage 
does not ensure effectiveness. 
Conclusions 
In  summary, this  is  a nice  paper trying to handle a complex task.  The 
authors  have  taken  a  new  and  rigorous  approach to  the  transfer  pricing 
problem, isolating differences between P(T) and P(A) and relating them to 
tax  differentials.  The  paper  concludes that  the  petroleum MNCs  did  not 
substantially manipulate transfer prices between  1973 and  1984. This is a 
surprising  result  since  it  is  contrary  to  theoretical  predictions  of  MNC 
behavior, conventional wisdom, and previous tests. 
My conclusions are somewhat different. Although the Bernard and Weiner 
approach  is  clearly  superior to  earlier  tests,  both  the  amount  of  transfer 
pricing and the tax differential, as measured in the paper, are problematic on 
theoretical  and  empirical  grounds.  Additional  information  is  needed  to 
determine the actual amount of transfer price manipulation in response to tax 
differentials. 159  Multinationals, Transfer Prices, and Taxes 
As  explained  above,  the  required  information  would  include  the 
organizational  form of  the  affiliates,  the  statutory  tax  rate  affecting  each 
affiliate, the foreign tax credit limitation used, the share of affiliate exports 
produced  within  the  MNC  relative  to  that  purchased  from  the  host 
government,  the  location  of  the  shipping  affiliate,  the  role  of  the  posted 
price, and the size of the royalty payment.  Clearly, this is a tall order. 
My presumption,  therefore,  in the absence of  this additional evidence,  is 
to continue to assume the petroleum MNCs guilty until proved innocent. 
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